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“The Lord’s Work”: An Overview of CEQA’s Judicial
Remedies and Recommendations for Reform
Michelle Ouellette & Ali Tehrani

I.

Introduction

The California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) 1 has its critics. Even
Governor Jerry Brown once famously called CEQA reform “the Lord’s work.”2
This is perhaps because, as noted by former Governors George Deukmejian, Pete
Wilson, and Gray Davis: “CEQA lawsuits are frequently filed only to ext ract
concessions not related to the environment, or for the purpose of opposing a project
for reasons having nothing to do with environmental protection.”3
Despite these criticisms, CEQA plays a vital role in protecting California’s
environment and informing decision makers and the public of a proposed project’s
environmental impacts. Public agencies a nd developers are all too familiar with
CEQA mercenaries—lawyers or organizations that nitpick CEQA documents,
looking to extract money or concessions in exchange for an agreement not to use
CEQA as a cudgel against the project. Yet, as the effects of climate change ravage
California,4 CEQA’s role has never been so important. The challenge lies in
balancing CEQA’s noble purposes against the need for social, economic, and


Michelle Ouellette is a partner at Best Best & Krieger LLP. She was the recipient
of the Daily Journal’s Environmental California Lawyer Attorney of the Year Award in
2017, and a Daily Journal headline about Michelle once read, “Enough CEQA Wins to Fill
a Bucket.” In her thirty year career, she has successfully litigated hundreds of CEQA cases
and helped her clients proceed with hundreds of projects across California.

Ali Tehrani is an associate attorney at Best Best & Krieg er LLP. Ali li tigates
CEQA issues on behalf of public agency and developer clients, reviews and drafts CEQArelated documents, and helps his clients navigate through the CEQA process.
1. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21000, et al (2018).
2. Adrian Glick Kudler, There’s a Last Minute Rush to Completely Overhaul
California’s Big Environmental Law, CURBED LOS ANGELES (Aug. 23 , 2012),
https://perma.cc/6DCT-ZBC9.
3. George Deukmejian, Pete Wilson & Gra y Davis, Keep California green and
golden with CEQA reforms, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (July 12, 2012),
https://perma.cc/H9AN-Q8KV.
4. Unprecedented wildfires, record heat, and crushing drought po se increasingly
difficult challenges for the Golden State. Robinson Meyer, Why the Wildfires of 2018 Have
Been So Ferocious, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/XL4N-478R.
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technological development. CEQA itself recognizes the need to balance these
interests.5 This article discusses how CEQA balances these interests in the context
of judicial remedies.
What happens when a court finds that a public agency has fallen short of
fully complying with CEQA? Must the result be a crushing defeat for the public
agency, the project proponent, and the public that stood to benefit from the project?
Must the agency set aside its CEQA determination and its project approvals? Can
the project move forward while the a gency seeks to comply with the writ o f
mandate? As always with CEQA, it depends. These questions hinge, in part, on
how courts exercise their substantial discretion to apply CEQA’s statutory judicial
remedies.
First, because judicial remedies should be narrowly tailored to fulfill
CEQA’s objectives, this article ex amines CEQA’s purposes and how CEQA
works. This article th en briefly discusses what a CEQA violation entails, since
there is no exercise of a judicial remedy without a CEQA violation. A discussion
of judicial remedies and the extent to which a court has discretion to require CEQA
compliance without setting aside project approvals follows. Finally, this article will
address “the Lord’s work”—common sense reforms that might reduce CEQA’s
regulatory burden without sacrificing the statute’s objectives.

II. How projects comply with CEQA and what courts must do
upon finding noncompliance6
CEQA is an environmental statute that generally applies to projects that (1)
require discretionary approval from a California public agency, and (2) have the
potential to result in d irect or reasonably foreseeable indirect impacts on th e
physical environment.7 The primary way CEQA seeks to protect the environment
is by requiring preparation of an environmental impact report (“EIR”) for a
proposed project that “may have a significant effect on the environment.”8
5. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15003(j) (1970).
6. This is a ver y annotated discussion of CEQA’s complex statu tory scheme. The
purpose of this section is merely to provide context. This discussion is not intended to
provide a complete overview of CEQA, and it does not address various nuances and
exceptions to CEQA’s rules.
7. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15378 (1970).
8. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21151(a) (1977); see also Tomlinson v. City of Alameda,
54 Cal. 4th 281, 286 (2012). A public agency need not necessarily prepare an EIR to comply
with CEQA; indeed, there are many means of CEQA com pliance. Depending on the
circumstances, a public agency may comply with CEQA by determining that (1) a proposed
activity does not qualify as a “project” subject to CEQA; (2) the proposed activity qualifies
as a “project,” but that the project is exempt from CEQA; (3) a negative declaration—rather
than an EIR—is appropriate for a non-exempt project based on an initial study’s finding that
86
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The EIR has been described as the “heart of CEQA.” 9 In short, an EIR is a
“detailed statement . . . describing and analyzing the si gnificant environmental
effects of a pro ject and d iscussing ways to mitigate or avoid the effects.”10 Its
purpose is “to inform the public and its responsible officials of the environmental
consequences of their decisions before they are made.”11 An EIR is generally very
extensive, expensive, and time consuming to prepare. For example, an EIR can be
thousands of pages long, analyze dozens of potential environmental impacts,12 and
include myriad technical appendices prepared by various consultants.
A party seeking to challenge a public agency’s compliance with CEQA (e.g.,
by challenging the adequacy of an EIR) does so by filing a petition for a writ of
mandate with a court.13 If a court finds that an agency’s determination, finding, or
decision does not comply with CEQA, the court must enter an order, in the form
of a peremptory writ of mandate, containing one or more of three specified
mandates, which are further addressed in the discussion of Public Resources Code
section 21168.9(a), below.14
Once the court issues a writ of mandate, “[t]he trial co urt shall retain
jurisdiction over the public agency’s proceedings by way of a return to th e

there is not subst antial evidence, in light of the whole of the record before the agenc y, that
the project may have a significant effect on th e environment; (4) a “mitigated” negative
declaration is appropriate where the initial study determines that a proposed project may have
potentially significant effects, but the project applicant agrees to revise the project to eliminate
or avoid those effects; or (5) an EIR must be prepared where the initial study determines that
the proposed project may have a significant effect on the environment (Cal. Pub. Res. Code,
§ 21151(a) (197 7); Tomlinson, 54 Cal. 4th 281). Additionall y, in certain circumstances,
CEQA compliance may require the preparation of other documents, such as a supplemental
EIR, a subsequent EIR, or an addendum to an EIR (Pub. Res. Co de, § 21166 (1972); Cal.
Code Regs. tit. 14, §§ 15162, 15164 (1970).) Because this article concerns judicial remedies
under CEQA—rather than a complete overview of CEQA itself—this article primarily
focuses on EIRs for the sake of simplicity. However, the law, procedures, and questions raised
in this article apply anytime a court determines that a public agency has prejudicially violated
CEQA (e.g., when a court determines that a public agency improperly found a project exempt
from CEQA or improperly prepared a negative declaration).
9. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of University of California, 6 Cal.
4th 1112, 1123 (1993).
10. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15362 (1970).
11. Id.
12. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, Appendix G (1970) (listing various environmental
impacts generally studied in an EIR).
13. 1KOSTKA & ZISCHKE, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY ACT § 23.61 (Cont. Ed. Bar 2d ed. 2015).
14. Pres. Wild Santee v. City of Santee, 210 Cal. App. 4th 260, 286 (2012); see also
Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9 (2017).
87
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peremptory writ until the court has determined that the public agency has complied
with [CEQA].”15

III. CEQA seeks to protect the environment and inform
governmental decision makers, not hinder development
To properly understand CEQA’s judicial remedies, one must first understand
the purposes CEQA seeks to serve. When Governor Ronald Reagan signed CEQA
into law in 1970,16 he di d not intend to obstruct development in California.17
Indeed, the State CEQA Guidelines18 expressly provide that CEQA “must not be
subverted into an instrument for the oppression and delay of social, economic or
recreational development or advancement.”19 Rather,
[t]he basic purposes of CEQA are to:
(1)Inform governmental decision makers and the public about the
potential, significant environmental effects of proposed activities.
(2)Identify ways that environmental damage can be avoided or
significantly reduced.
(3)Prevent significant, avoidable damage to the environment by
requiring changes in pr ojects through the use of alternatives or
mitigation measures when the governmental agency finds the
changes to be feasible.
(4)Disclose to the pu blic the reasons why a governmental agency
approved the project in the m anner the agency chose if significant
environmental effects are involved.20

15. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9(b) (2017).
16. CALIFORNIA NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
ABOUT CEQA (2014), https://perma.cc/RR9R-3UJJ.
17. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code, §§ 21000, 21001 (2018).
18. The Guidelines for California Environmental Quality Act, also known as the
State CEQA Guidelines, are codified in Title 14 of the C alifornia Code of R egulations,
commencing at section 15000. The State CEQ A Guidelines have been dev eloped by the
Office of Planning and Research, and they are binding on all public agencies in California.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15000 (1970).)
19. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15003(j) (1970); see also Maintain Our Desert Env’t v.
Town of Apple Valley, 120 Cal. App. 4th 396, 447 (2004); Pres. Poway v. City of Poway,
245 Cal. App. 4th 560, 581-582 (2016).
20. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15002(a) (1970).
88
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In sum, “CEQA’s purpose is to compel government to make decisions with
environmental consequences in mind,” not to stop development.21

IV. A CEQA violation must be “prejudicial” to warrant a
judicial remedy
Not every CEQA violation will lead a court to set aside a public agency’s
CEQA document or project approval.22 Rather, in reviewing an agency’s decision
for compliance with CEQA, “[t]h e court reviews the a dministrative record to
determine whether the agency prejudicially abused its d iscretion.”23 “Abuse of
discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by
law, or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.”24
Thus, the California Supreme Court has noted, that in the CEQA context,
“[i]nsubstantial or merely technical omissions are not grounds for relief.”25
However, a violation that undermines CEQA’s purpose may be considered
prejudicial. Thus, where the adequacy of an EIR is chall enged, “[a] prejudicial
abuse of discretion occurs if the failure to include relevant information precludes
informed decision-making and informed public participation, thereby thwarting
the statutory goals of the EIR process.”26 The requirement that CEQA violations
“be prejudicial” underscores the importance of keeping CEQA’s purposes in mind
when analyzing a CE QA claim and fa shioning a judicial remedy for a CEQA
violation.

21. Golden Gate Land Holdings LLC v. EastBay Reg’l Park Dist., 215 Cal. App. 4th
353, 365 (2013); see also Kings Cty. Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford, 221 Cal. App. 3d
692, 711 (1990) (“Although the purpose of CEQA is to compel government at all levels to
make decisions with environmental consequences in mind, ‘CEQA does not, indeed cannot,
guarantee that these de cisions will alwa ys be those wh ich favor environmental
considerations.’”).
22. See, e.g., Rominger v. Cty. of Colusa, 229 Cal. App. 4th 690, 709 (2014) (finding
county abused its discretion by failing to comply with CEQA’s information disclosure
requirements, but the abuse of discretion was not prejudicial).
23. Gilroy Citizens for Responsible Planning v. City of Gilro y, 140 Cal. App. 4th
911, 918 (2006) (emphasis added); see also Cal. Pub. Res. Code, §§ 21168, 21168.5 (1972).
24. Ibid.
25. Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Constr. Auth., 57 C al. 4th
439, 463 (2013).
26. Id. (emphasis added); see also Kings Cty. Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford, 221
Cal. App. 3d 69 2, 711 (1990); Laurel Heigh ts Improvement Assn. v. Reg ents of Univ. of
Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 376, 404 (1988) (in finding abuse of discretion, California Supreme Court
explained: “the EIR’s statutory goal of public information regarding a proposed project has
not been met”) (emphasis added).
89
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V. Courts have broad discretion to tailor a remedy addressing
a prejudicial CEQA violation
CEQA is not designed to be draconian. When a lead agency fails to comply
with CEQA, the law does not require that project approvals or the relevant CEQA
documents be set aside. Rather, as discussed below, CEQA generally provides
courts with broad discretion to fashion a remedy that furthers CEQA’s purpose.
A. Public Resources Code Section 21168.9 provides courts with broad
discretion to fashion a narrowly tailored remedy that furthers CEQA’s
purpose without unduly burdening development
The judicial remedies for a CEQA violation are governed by section 21168.9
of the Public Resources Code.27 This provision was initially enacted in 1984—
fourteen years after CEQA became law—to provide courts “with some flexibility
in tailoring the remedy to the specific CEQA violation.”28 To provide courts with
even more flexibility, section 21168.9 was amended in 1 993 to “expand the
authority of courts to fashion a remedy that permits a part of the project to continue
while the agency seeks to correct its CEQA violations.”29
This flexibility allows courts to exercise substantial discretion in fashioning
a remedy for a CEQA violation. For example, to remedy a CEQA violation, a court
may:




issue a writ of mandate directing the public agency to void its approval of
the project;30
allow project approvals and EIR certification to remain in place, but direct
the public agency to take certain measures to comply with CEQA;31
allow project construction to proceed, except for those aspects of
construction affected by the CEQA violation;32 or

27. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9 (1972).
28. POET, LLC v. California Air Resources Bd., 218 Cal. App. 4th 681, 756 (2013)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter POET I].
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood, 45 Cal. 4th 116, 127-128 (2008);
John R. Lawson Rock & Oil, Inc. v. State Air R es. Bd., 20 Cal. App. 5th 77, 10 2 (2018)
(“Directing an agency to void its approval of the project is a typical remedy … for a CEQA
violation”).
31. See, e.g., POET I, 218 Cal. App. 4th at 756.
32. See, e.g., Pres. Wild Santee v . City of Santee, 210 Cal. App. 4 th 260 (2012) ;
Anderson First Coal. v. City of Anderson, 130 Cal. App. 4th 1173 (2005).
90
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rescind project approval and require the project, if con structed while
CEQA litigation was pending, to be “modified, torn down, or eliminated
to restore the property to its original condition.”33

To understand how this range of outcomes is po ssible, one must look to
Public Resources Code section 21168.9, which provides courts with discretion to
narrowly tailor writs of mandate to fu lfill CEQA’s purposes without unduly
obstructing the project. In particular, section 21168.9 provides, in its entirety:
(a) If a court finds, as a result of a trial, hearing, or remand from
an appellate court, that any d etermination, finding, or
decision of a public agency has been made without
compliance with [CEQA], the court shall enter an order that
includes one or more of the following:
(1)

A mandate that the determination, finding, or decision
be voided by the public agency, in whole or in part.

(2)

If the court finds that a sp ecific project activity or
activities will p rejudice the consideration or
implementation of particular mitigation measures or
alternatives to the project, a mandate that the public
agency and any real parties in interest suspend any or
all specific project activity or activities, pursuant to the
determination, finding, or decision, that could result in
an adverse change or alteration to t he physical
environment, until the public agency has taken any
actions that may be necessary to bring the
determination, finding, or decision into compliance
with [CEQA].

(3)

A mandate that the public agency take specific action
as may be necessary to bring the determination,
finding, or decision into compliance with [CEQA].

(b) Any order pursuant to subdivision (a) shall include only
those mandates which are necessary to achieve compliance
with [CEQA] and only those specific project activities in
noncompliance with [CEQA]. The order shall be made by
33.
(2000).

Woodward Park Homeowners Ass’n v. Garreks, Inc., 77 Cal. App. 4th 880, 889
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the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate specifying
what action by the public a gency is necessary to c omply
with [CEQA]. However, the order shall be limited to that
portion of a determination, finding, or decision or the
specific project activity or activities found to be in
noncompliance only if a court find s that (1) the portion or
specific project activity or activities are sev erable, (2)
severance will not prejudice complete and full compliance
with [CEQA], and (3) the court has not found the remainder
of the project to be in noncompliance with [CEQA]. The
trial court shall retain jurisdiction over the public agency’s
proceedings by way of a return to the peremptory writ until
the court has determined that the public agency has
complied with [CEQA].
(c) Nothing in this section authorizes a court to direct any public
agency to ex ercise its d iscretion in an y particular way.
Except as expressly provided in this section, nothing in this
section is intended to limit the equitable powers of the
court.34
Section 21168.9 thus provides courts with broad discretion to fashion judicial
remedies under CEQA. Accordingly, if a trial court determines that a C EQA
document is inadequate in some but not all respects, the court need not necessarily
direct the public agency to set aside its approvals of the CEQA document and the
project in their entirety. Indeed, section 21168.9 repeatedly emphasizes that to the
extent possible, judicial remedies should be narrowly tailored to further the
purposes of CEQA. Notably:


Subsections (1), (2), and (3) of section 21168.9(a) are in the disjunctive.35
For example, a court may require a public agency to further review a
potential environmental impact under section 21168.9(a)(3), without
voiding any part of a project approval under section 21168.9(a)(1) and
without suspending any project activity under section 21168.9(a)(2).36

34. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9 (1972).
35. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9(a) (1972) (“the court shall enter an order that
includes one or more of the following . . .”) (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., POET, LLC v. State Air Res.
Bd., 12 Cal. App. 5th 52 (2017)
[hereinafter POET II].
92
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Section 21168.9(a)(1) authorizes a court to direct a public agency to void
its project approvals “in whole or in part.”37
Section 21168.9(a)(2) authorizes a cou rt to direct a public agency to
suspend “any or all” specific project activities only if the court finds that
such activity undermines CEQA’s basic purposes.38
Section 21168.9(b) emphasizes that judicial remedies under CEQA must
be narrowly tailored, to the extent possible.39
Section 21168.9(c) underscores that courts may fashion remedies
pursuant to their “equitable powers.”40

Section 21168.9 thus does not require courts to set aside EIR certification or
project approvals every tim e the court fi nds a CEQA violation. Rather, courts
could—and should—craft narrow judicial remedies that further CEQA’s purpose
without unduly obstructing project development.
B. Courts have repeatedly used their discretion under Public Resources
Code Section 21168.9 to leave portions of project approvals and EIR
certifications in place despite finding CEQA noncompliance
Many courts have used their discretion under Public Resources Code section
21168.9 to fashion narrowly tailored remedies that pe rmit at least portions of a
project to proceed, despite finding that a public agency has failed to fully comply
with CEQA.41 These decisions are a valuable example of how courts may balance
the need to fulfill CEQA’s important purposes with California’s social, economic,
and environmental interests.
1.

The following examples support allowing a project to proceed
despite some CEQA noncompliance
a) Court balanced CEQA compliance and continued
development

Anderson First Coalition v City of Anderson is an excellent example of a
court narrowly tailoring its judicial remedy to ensure compliance with CEQA
37. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9(a)(1) (1972).
38. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9(a)(2) (1972).
39. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9(b) (1972) (court’s order “shall include only those
mandates which are necessary to achieve compliance with [CEQA] and only those specific
project activities in noncompliance with [CEQA]”) (emphasis added).
40. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9(c) (1972).
41. See, e.g., Anderson, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 1173.
93
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without needlessly obstructing development.42 This case stemmed from the City of
Anderson’s approval of a s hopping center comprised of an 184,000 square-foot
Wal-Mart Supercenter, three other commercial retail pads, and a gas station.43 The
petitioner challenged the project’s approval on the basis that, among other things,
the environmental impacts of the proposed gas station were not fully analyzed in
the EIR.44 The trial court, pursuant to Public Resources Code section 21168.9,
severed the gas station from the rest of the project and ordered the real parties in
interest to suspend all activity on the gas station until its environmental impacts
were properly analyzed.45 However, the court allowed construction and operation
of the rest of the project to proceed.46
The appellate court affirmed based on Public Resources Code section
21168.9, subdivisions (a)(1) and (b).47 Specifically, the appellate court held that
the gas station was properly severable from the remainder of the project where (1)
the infirmities in the EIR were limited solely to impacts associated with the
proposed gas station; (2) the construction and operation of the gas station were
specific project activities severable from the remainder of the project; (3) severance
of the gas station from the remainder of the project would not prejudice complete
and full compliance with CEQA; and (4) the remainder of the project was in full
compliance with CEQA.48
The appellate court also rejected the petitioner’s argument that the severance
remedy under Public Resources Code section 21168.9(b) “was originally designed
to address only relatively minor matters of noncompliance with CEQA.”49 In
rejecting the argument, Anderson noted that section 21168.9 was amended in 1993
to expand the trial court’s authority to fashion a remedy, and that “the issuance of
a writ need not always halt all work on a project.”50

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
94

Anderson, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 1173.
Id. at 1177.
Id. at 1177–78.
Id. at 1177–79.
Id.
Id. at 1179–80.
Anderson, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 1180–81.
Id. at 1181.
Id.
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b) POET, LLC v. California Air Resources Board and POET,
LLC v. State Air Resources Board illustrate courts’ ability to
balance CEQA compliance and project completion
Both POET, LLC v. California Air Resources Bd., 218 Cal. App. 4th 681
(2013) (“POET I”)51 and POET, LLC v. State Air Res. Bd., 12 Cal. App. 5th 52
(2017) (“POET II”)52 illustrate the wide discretion that courts have to narro wly
fashion judicial remedies that fulfill CEQA’s purposes without unduly obstructing
a project. These cases stem from the California Air Resources Board’s (“CARB”)
approval of low carbon fuel standard (“LCFS”) regulations pursuant to the
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.53
In POET I, the appellate court held that CARB violated CEQA in its approval
of the regulations, ordered CARB to void its approval of LCFS regulations, and
directed CARB to c orrect its CEQA vi olations.54 Despite voiding CARB’s
approval of LCFS regulations, the court held that “the LCFS regulations should
remain in operation so long as [CARB] is diligent in taking the action necessary to
bring its approval of the project into compliance with CEQA.”55 Based on its
interpretation of subdivisions (a)(1), (a)(2), (b), and (c) of Public Resources Code
section 21168.9, POET I held that “a court’s decision to void the approval of a
regulation, ordinance or program does not necessarily require the court to
invalidate or suspend the operation of the regulation, ordinance or program.”56
“Instead, in extraordinary cases, the c ourt may exercise its inhere nt equitable
authority to maintain the status quo and allow the regulations to rem ain
operative.”57 In deciding not to suspend the LCFS regulations, despite voiding their
approval, the court emphasized the importance of crafting a judicial remedy that
furthers CEQA’s purposes.58 In particular, the appellate court emphasized that
leaving LCFS regulations in place provides more protection for the environment
than suspending their operation pending CARB’s compliance with CEQA.59
POET II addressed whether CARB satisfied the writ of mandate issued after
POET I and corrected its CEQA violations.60 The appellate court held that CARB
failed to comply with the previously issued writ of mandate and that its attempt to

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

POET I, 218 Cal. App. 4th 681 (2013).
POET II, 12 Cal. App. 5th 52 (2017).
Id. at 56-57.
POET I, 218 Cal. App. 4th at 760.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 761.
Id.
Id. at 758, 762.
Id. at 762.
POET II, 12 Cal. App. 5th at 57.
95
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comply with the writ was not in good faith.61 Despite this, the appellate court did
not suspend the LCFS regulations.62 Instead, the appellate court held, once again,
that the beneficial effects of the regulations outweighed their potential adverse
impacts.63 In reaching this conclusion, the court again underscored that judicial
remedies under CEQA should further CEQA’s purposes, explaining that “the goals
of CEQA should not be compromised to punish agency bad faith.”64
2.

LandValue 77, LLC v. Board of Trustees of California State
University held that a project approval must be set aside if any
portion of the EIR fails to comply with CEQA, but subsequent
cases rejected this holding

Despite the overwhelming textual evidence that judicial remedies under
CEQA should be narrowly tailored, LandValue 77, LLC v. Board of Trustees of
California State University65 held that a publ ic agency must set aside all project
approvals and the certification of the EIR, where the court finds that a n EIR is
inadequate in some, but not all, respects.66
LandValue 77 involved a challenge to the approval of a m ixed-use
development project and the EIR certification for that project.67 The trial court
determined the EIR inadequately analyzed three limited environmental impacts of
the proposed project.68 Nonetheless, the trial court did not require decertification
of the entire EIR and did not overturn the entire project approval.69 The appellate
court reversed, holding that “the trial court’s determination that the final EIR was
inadequate in certain respects requires an order directing the Board of Trustees to
set aside its certification of the final EIR as well as its approval of the project.”70
In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court (1) noted that the trial court
did not sever the project under Public Resources Code section 21168.9(b), and (2)
relied on a treatise, wh ich addressed the application of sectio n 21168.9 when a
project has not been severed.71 The treatise provides that when a trial court has not
severed a project pursuant to section 21168.9(b), and the EIR is inadequate in some
61. POET II, 12 Cal. App. 5th at 100.
62. Id. at 101-02.
63. Id. at 101.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. LandValue 77, LLC v. Board of Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 193 Cal. App. 4th
675, (2011).
66. Id. at 681–83.
67. Id. at 677.
68. Id. at 678.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 683.
71. LandValue 77, 193 Cal. App. 4th 675 at 681–82.
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respect, the local age ncy must set as ide all project approvals and the EIR
certification in its entirety.72
The appellate court relied on this treatise, but ultimately reached a conclusion
that was more extreme than what was expressed in the treatise. In particular, the
appellate court categorically “reject[ed] the idea of partial certification” of an
EIR.73 The court explained that “[t]he statutes and CEQA Guidelines provide for
the certification of an EIR when it is complete, and the concept of completeness is
not compatible with partial certification. In short, an EIR is either complete or it is
not.”74 The court then held that when an EIR is leg ally inadequate, the project
approvals must be set aside.75
Subsequent cases have—with good cause—expressly disagreed with
LandValue 77’s holding. In Preserve Wild Santee v. City of Santee, the appellate
court expressly rejected the argument that “whenever a trial court finds an EIR
inadequate, the trial co urt must decertify the EIR a nd vacate all related project
approvals.”76 Preserve Wild Santee explained “a reasonable, commonsense reading
of section 21168.9 plainly forecloses plaintiffs’ assertion that a t rial court must
mandate a public agency decertify the EIR and void all related project approvals in
every instance where the court finds an EIR violates CEQA.”77 The appellate court
held that “[s]uch a rigid requirement directly conflicts with the “in part” language
in section 21168.9, subdivision (a)(1), which specifically allows a court to direct
its mandates to “parts of determinations, parts of findings, or parts of decisions.”78
The appellate court further held that “[s]uch a rigid requirement also conflicts with
the language in section 21168.9, subdivision (b), limiting the court’s mandate to
only those necessary to achieve CEQA compliance and, if the court makes
specified findings, to only ‘that portion of a determination, finding, or decision’
violating CEQA.”79 Moreover, Preserve Wild Santee expressly dis missed
LandValue 77’s contrary conclusion on the basis that both LandValue 77 and the
treatise it relied on ignored the “in part” language of section 21168.9(a)(1).80
More recently, the appellate court in Center for Biological Diversity v.
Department of Fish & Wildlife81 examined both LandValue 77 and Preserve Wild
Santee, and ultimately agreed wi th the reasoning and holding of Preserve Wild
72. LandValue 77, 193 Cal. App. 4th 675 at 681–82.
73. Id. at 682.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 683.
76. Preserve Wild Santee v. City of Santee, 210 Cal. App. 4th 260, 286 (2012).
77. Id. at 288.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 289.
81. Center for Biological Divers ity v. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, 17 Cal. App. 5th
1245 (2017).
97

2_OUELLETTE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/21/2018 10:51 AM

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, Winter 2019

Santee.82 In Center for Biological Diversity, the trial court found the EIR defective
as to certai n issues, and iss ued a writ directing the public agency to, (1) void
portions—not all—of the EIR; (2) enjoin all project activity until the EIR complied
with CEQA; and (3) suspend two of the six approvals for the project. 83 The issue
was whether section 21168.9 prohibits pa rtial decertification of an EIR, and
whether project approvals m ay be left in place after the EIR for the project is
decertified. In agreeing with Preserve Wild Santee, the appellate court noted that
section 21168.9 “clearly allows a court to order partial decertification of an EIR”
as long as, pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 21168.9, the court determines that
the voided portions are severable and that the remainder of the EIR fully complies
with CEQA.84 Center for Biological Diversity further distinguished LandValue 77
on the basis that the trial court in that case did not determine that the project was
severable under Public Resources Code section 21168.9(b).85 Moreover, Center for
Biological Diversity explained that under subdivision (b) of section 21168.9, “if
the court finds that it will not prejudice full compliance with CEQA to leave some
project approvals in place, it must leave them unaffected.”86
The reasoning in Preserve Wild Santee and Center for Biological Diversity
appears to have a stronger statutory basis than the court’s reasoning in LandValue
77. As evidenced by Preserve Wild Santee, Center for Biological Diversity,
Anderson, and the POET cases, CEQA affirmatively requires a court to narrowly
fashion a judicial remedy consistent with section 21168.9, particularly when the
project is severable. Still, as LandValue 77 illustrates, ambiguity exists. Reform of
Public Resources Code section 21168.9 is warranted to remove ambiguity and to
make clear that judicial remedies under CEQA should be tailored as narrowly as
possible to further CEQA’s purposes without unduly obstructing projects from
proceeding forward.

VI. Recommendations for reform of Public Resources Code
Section 21168.9
Public Resources Code section 21168.9 is relatively well-drafted and
provides courts with valuable discretion to narrowly tailor remedies effectuating
CEQA’s purposes. Nonetheless, this article suggests three ways to reform section
21168.9—or State CEQA Guidelines implementing section 21168.9—to ensure
that remedies further CEQA’s purposes without needless collateral damage.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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First, section 21168.9 could be amended to codify the holdings of POET I
and POET II.87 Specifically, section 21168.9 or State CEQA Guidelines could be
amended to (1) explicitly encourage courts to fashion equitable remedies to address
a CEQA violation where the court determines that such a remedy furthers CEQA’s
purpose; and (2) provide that an agency may proceed with a project, or individual
project activities, during the remand period where the court has exercised its
equitable discretion to perm it project activities to proceed during that period.88
Moreover, State CEQA Guidelines could be amended to advise that project
approvals should remain in place where, as i n the POET cases, the environment
will be given a greater level of pro tection if the project remains operative during
the remand period. These revisions would further CEQA’s goal of protecting the
environment, while also easing the burden on public agencies to approve
regulations, ordinances, general plans, or similar items.
Second, section 21168.9 could be amended to limit a co urt’s authority to
vacate project approvals unless the court finds that failure to vacate the approvals
would result in an imminent threat of actual environmental damage. This
encourages courts to su spend—rather than vacate—project approvals until the
public agency takes all necessary action to comply with CEQA.89
Third, section 21168.9 could be amended to codify existing case law and
make clear that application of its judicial remedies is appropriate only where t he
court finds a prejudicial violation of CEQA.90 Again, this would ensure that the
application of judicial remedies under section 21168.9 furthers CEQA’s purposes,
rather than unduly obstructs a project.
These reforms, if adopted, would further define the extensive discretion of
courts to fashion narrowly tailored remedies that a dvance CEQA’s purposes
without unnecessarily obstructing development. Ultimately, CEQA is not perfect,
and these recommended reforms will not solve everything. The process of tinkering
with CEQA t o further its environmental and in formational purposes without
unduly hindering development is a tightrope that legislators will likely walk for as
long as CEQA exists.

87. POET I, 218 Cal. App. 4th at 760-63; POET II, 12 Cal. App. 5th at 100–101.
88. OFFICE OF PLAN. & RES., PROPOSED UPDATES TO THE CEQA GUIDELINES
(November 2017), https://perma.cc/96KX-GRQ4 (Proposing updates to the State CEQA
Guidelines, including the addition of § 15234 memorializing the outcome of POET I).
89. See Center for Biological Diversity, 17 C al. App. 5th at 1251 (suspending—
rather than vacating—two of six project approvals).
90. See, e.g., Neighbors for Smart Rail, 57 Cal. 4th at 463.
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VII. Conclusion
Governor Jerry Brown may have referred to CEQA reform as “the L ord’s
work,” but CEQA itself serves an important purpose in protecting the environment
and keeping both decision makers and the public informed.91 When a court finds
that a public agency has violated CEQA, Public Resources Code section 21168.9
gives the court discretion to narrowly tailor judicial remedies to further CEQA’s
important purposes, without unduly obstructing proposed projects and
development. CEQA reform should not compromise CEQA’s important purpose,
but rather ensure that its purpose is achieved while minimizing unnecessary
obstacles to development.

91. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15002(a); see also Golden Gate Landholdings, 215 Cal.
App. 4th at 365.
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